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Does market exclusivity hinder the development of Follow-on Orphan Medicinal Products in Europe?
BACKGROUND: We determined whether the market exclusivity incentive of the European Orphan Drug Regulation results in a market monopoly or that absence of another Orphan Medicinal Product (OMP) for the same rare disorder, a so-called follow-on OMP, is a matter of time or market size. In the interest...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
BioMed Central
2011
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3185263/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21892964 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1750-1172-6-59 |
Sumario: | BACKGROUND: We determined whether the market exclusivity incentive of the European Orphan Drug Regulation results in a market monopoly or that absence of another Orphan Medicinal Product (OMP) for the same rare disorder, a so-called follow-on OMP, is a matter of time or market size. In the interest of rare disorder patients better understanding of the effect of the market exclusivity incentive on follow-on OMP development is warranted. METHODS: First, the impact of various market-, product- and disease-related characteristics on follow-on OMP development in the EU was determined by comparing rare disorders with an approved OMP and at least one follow-on OMP (N = 26), with rare disorders with an approved OMP and no follow-on OMP (N = 18). Next, we determined whether manufacturers continued development of a follow-on OMP upon approval of the first OMP for the intended rare disorder. Since in the EU significant benefit of an OMP has to be established, we determined for each follow-on OMP for which development was continued on what grounds significant benefit was assumed by the sponsor. Data were collected from the public domain only. RESULTS: The likelihood of a rare disorder with an approved OMP to obtain at least one follow-on OMP development was strongly associated with disease prevalence, turnover of the first OMP, disease class, disease-specific scientific output and age of onset. Out of a total of 120 follow-on OMPs only one follow-on OMP could be identified for which development was discontinued upon approval of the first OMP for the same rare disorder. Only a substantial level of discontinuation of follow-on OMP development would have indicated the existence of a market monopoly. Moreover, sponsors that continued development of a follow-on OMP predominantly assumed that their product had an improved efficacy compared to the first approved OMP. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides evidence that absence of follow-on OMP development is a matter of time or market size, rather than that the market exclusivity incentive of the European Orphan Drug Regulation creates a market monopoly. |
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