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The Structure of Mutations and the Evolution of Cooperation
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e., if there are [Image: see text] strategies a single mutation can result in any strategy with probability [Image: see text]. However, in biological systems it seems natural that not all mutations can...
Autores principales: | García, Julián, Traulsen, Arne |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2012
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3338512/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22563381 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035287 |
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