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Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination

Live vaccination against polio has effectively prevented outbreaks in most developed countries for more than 40 years, and there remain only a few countries where outbreaks of poliomyelitis by the wild strain still threaten the community. It is expected that worldwide eradication will be eventually...

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Autores principales: Sasaki, Akira, Haraguchi, Yoshihiro, Yoshida, Hiromu
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Research Foundation 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3390584/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22783231
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2012.00178
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author Sasaki, Akira
Haraguchi, Yoshihiro
Yoshida, Hiromu
author_facet Sasaki, Akira
Haraguchi, Yoshihiro
Yoshida, Hiromu
author_sort Sasaki, Akira
collection PubMed
description Live vaccination against polio has effectively prevented outbreaks in most developed countries for more than 40 years, and there remain only a few countries where outbreaks of poliomyelitis by the wild strain still threaten the community. It is expected that worldwide eradication will be eventually achieved through careful surveillance and a well-managed immunization program. The present paper argues, however, that based on a simple stochastic model the risk of outbreak by a vaccine-derived strain after the cessation of vaccination is quite high, even if many years have passed since the last confirmed case. As vaccinated hosts are natural reservoirs for virulent poliovirus, the source of the risk is the vaccination itself, employed to prevent the outbreaks. The crisis after stopping vaccination will emerge when the following two conditions are met: the susceptible host density exceeds the threshold for epidemics and the vaccinated host density remains large enough to ensure the occurrence of virulent mutants in the population. Our estimates for transmission, recovery, and mutation rates, show that the probability of an outbreak of vaccine-derived virulent viruses easily exceeds 90%. Moreover, if a small fraction of hosts have a longer infectious period, as observed in individuals with innate immunodeficiency, the risk of an outbreak rises significantly. Under such conditions, successful global eradication of polio is restricted to a certain range of parameters even if inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) is extensively used after the termination of live vaccination.
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spelling pubmed-33905842012-07-10 Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination Sasaki, Akira Haraguchi, Yoshihiro Yoshida, Hiromu Front Microbiol Microbiology Live vaccination against polio has effectively prevented outbreaks in most developed countries for more than 40 years, and there remain only a few countries where outbreaks of poliomyelitis by the wild strain still threaten the community. It is expected that worldwide eradication will be eventually achieved through careful surveillance and a well-managed immunization program. The present paper argues, however, that based on a simple stochastic model the risk of outbreak by a vaccine-derived strain after the cessation of vaccination is quite high, even if many years have passed since the last confirmed case. As vaccinated hosts are natural reservoirs for virulent poliovirus, the source of the risk is the vaccination itself, employed to prevent the outbreaks. The crisis after stopping vaccination will emerge when the following two conditions are met: the susceptible host density exceeds the threshold for epidemics and the vaccinated host density remains large enough to ensure the occurrence of virulent mutants in the population. Our estimates for transmission, recovery, and mutation rates, show that the probability of an outbreak of vaccine-derived virulent viruses easily exceeds 90%. Moreover, if a small fraction of hosts have a longer infectious period, as observed in individuals with innate immunodeficiency, the risk of an outbreak rises significantly. Under such conditions, successful global eradication of polio is restricted to a certain range of parameters even if inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) is extensively used after the termination of live vaccination. Frontiers Research Foundation 2012-05-21 /pmc/articles/PMC3390584/ /pubmed/22783231 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2012.00178 Text en Copyright © 2012 Sasaki, Haraguchi and Yoshida. http://www.frontiersin.org/licenseagreement This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial License, which permits non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in other forums, provided the original authors and source are credited.
spellingShingle Microbiology
Sasaki, Akira
Haraguchi, Yoshihiro
Yoshida, Hiromu
Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination
title Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination
title_full Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination
title_fullStr Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination
title_full_unstemmed Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination
title_short Estimating the Risk of Re-Emergence after Stopping Polio Vaccination
title_sort estimating the risk of re-emergence after stopping polio vaccination
topic Microbiology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3390584/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22783231
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2012.00178
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