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Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on...
Autores principales: | Szolnoki, Attila, Wang, Zhen, Perc, Matjaž |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2012
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3418638/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22893854 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00576 |
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