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Evolutionary Dynamics of Strategic Behavior in a Collective-Risk Dilemma
A collective-risk social dilemma arises when a group must cooperate to reach a common target in order to avoid the risk of collective loss while each individual is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. In contrast to the prisoners' dilemma or public goods games, the collective-ri...
Autores principales: | Abou Chakra, Maria, Traulsen, Arne |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2012
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3426567/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22927807 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002652 |
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