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Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots
Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experiment...
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Nature Publishing Group
2012
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3437515/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22966421 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00646 |