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Evolution of cooperation driven by zealots

Recent experimental results with humans involved in social dilemma games suggest that cooperation may be a contagious phenomenon and that the selection pressure operating on evolutionary dynamics (i.e., mimicry) is relatively weak. I propose an evolutionary dynamics model that links these experiment...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Masuda, Naoki
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3437515/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22966421
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00646

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