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I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others
The ability to understand and predict others’ behavior is essential for successful interactions. When making predictions about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their mental states such as desires and intentions. In the p...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2012
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3458834/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23049794 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0045391 |
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author | Wiese, Eva Wykowska, Agnieszka Zwickel, Jan Müller, Hermann J. |
author_facet | Wiese, Eva Wykowska, Agnieszka Zwickel, Jan Müller, Hermann J. |
author_sort | Wiese, Eva |
collection | PubMed |
description | The ability to understand and predict others’ behavior is essential for successful interactions. When making predictions about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their mental states such as desires and intentions. In the present experiments, we investigated whether the mere belief that the observed agent is an intentional system influences basic social attention mechanisms. We presented pictures of a human and a robot face in a gaze cuing paradigm and manipulated the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance by instruction: in some conditions, participants were told that they were observing a human or a robot, in others, that they were observing a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were controlled by a human. In conditions in which participants were made to believe they were observing human behavior (intentional stance likely) gaze cuing effects were significantly larger as compared to conditions when adopting the intentional stance was less likely. This effect was independent of whether a human or a robot face was presented. Therefore, we conclude that adopting the intentional stance when observing others’ behavior fundamentally influences basic mechanisms of social attention. The present results provide striking evidence that high-level cognitive processes, such as beliefs, modulate bottom-up mechanisms of attentional selection in a top-down manner. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-3458834 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2012 |
publisher | Public Library of Science |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-34588342012-10-03 I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others Wiese, Eva Wykowska, Agnieszka Zwickel, Jan Müller, Hermann J. PLoS One Research Article The ability to understand and predict others’ behavior is essential for successful interactions. When making predictions about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their mental states such as desires and intentions. In the present experiments, we investigated whether the mere belief that the observed agent is an intentional system influences basic social attention mechanisms. We presented pictures of a human and a robot face in a gaze cuing paradigm and manipulated the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance by instruction: in some conditions, participants were told that they were observing a human or a robot, in others, that they were observing a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were controlled by a human. In conditions in which participants were made to believe they were observing human behavior (intentional stance likely) gaze cuing effects were significantly larger as compared to conditions when adopting the intentional stance was less likely. This effect was independent of whether a human or a robot face was presented. Therefore, we conclude that adopting the intentional stance when observing others’ behavior fundamentally influences basic mechanisms of social attention. The present results provide striking evidence that high-level cognitive processes, such as beliefs, modulate bottom-up mechanisms of attentional selection in a top-down manner. Public Library of Science 2012-09-26 /pmc/articles/PMC3458834/ /pubmed/23049794 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0045391 Text en © 2012 Wiese et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Wiese, Eva Wykowska, Agnieszka Zwickel, Jan Müller, Hermann J. I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others |
title | I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others |
title_full | I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others |
title_fullStr | I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others |
title_full_unstemmed | I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others |
title_short | I See What You Mean: How Attentional Selection Is Shaped by Ascribing Intentions to Others |
title_sort | i see what you mean: how attentional selection is shaped by ascribing intentions to others |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3458834/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23049794 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0045391 |
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