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Individual differences in behavioural inhibition explain free riding in public good games when punishment is expected but not implemented
BACKGROUND: The literature on social dilemmas and punishment focuses on the behaviour of the punisher. However, to fully explain the effect of punishment on cooperation, it is important to understand the psychological mechanisms influencing the behaviour of those who expect to be punished. This pape...
Autores principales: | Skatova, Anya, Ferguson, Eamonn |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
BioMed Central
2013
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3562176/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23305116 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1744-9081-9-3 |
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