Coordination on Networks: Does Topology Matter?

Effective coordination is key to many situations that affect the well-being of two or more humans. Social coordination can be studied in coordination games between individuals located on networks of contacts. We study the behavior of humans in the laboratory when they play the Stag Hunt game – a game that has a risky but socially efficient equilibrium and an inefficient but safe equilibrium. We contrast behavior on a cliquish network to behavior on a random network. The cliquish network is highly clustered and resembles more closely to actual social networks than the random network. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in the cliquish network than in the random network. Subjects do not use pure myopic best-reply as an individual update rule. Numerical simulations agree with laboratory results once we implement the actual individual updating rule that human subjects use in our laboratory experiments.