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The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion
The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such...
Autores principales: | Sasaki, Tatsuya, Uchida, Satoshi |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2013
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3574310/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23222449 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2498 |
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