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How Do Incentives Lead to Deception in Advisor–Client Interactions? Explicit and Implicit Strategies of Self-Interested Deception
When confronted with important questions we like to rely on the advice of experts. However, uncertainty can occur regarding advisors’ motivation to pursue self-interest and deceive the client. This can especially occur when the advisor has the possibility to receive an incentive by recommending a ce...
Autores principales: | Mackinger, Barbara, Jonas, Eva |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2012
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3578281/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23440297 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00527 |
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