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Human cooperation by lethal group competition

Why humans are prone to cooperate puzzles biologists, psychologists and economists alike. Between-group conflict has been hypothesized to drive within-group cooperation. However, such conflicts did not have lasting effects in laboratory experiments, because they were about luxury goods, not needed f...

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Autores principales: Egas, Martijn, Kats, Ralph, van der Sar, Xander, Reuben, Ernesto, Sabelis, Maurice W.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3587884/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23459158
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep01373
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author Egas, Martijn
Kats, Ralph
van der Sar, Xander
Reuben, Ernesto
Sabelis, Maurice W.
author_facet Egas, Martijn
Kats, Ralph
van der Sar, Xander
Reuben, Ernesto
Sabelis, Maurice W.
author_sort Egas, Martijn
collection PubMed
description Why humans are prone to cooperate puzzles biologists, psychologists and economists alike. Between-group conflict has been hypothesized to drive within-group cooperation. However, such conflicts did not have lasting effects in laboratory experiments, because they were about luxury goods, not needed for survival (“looting”). Here, we find within-group cooperation to last when between-group conflict is implemented as “all-out war” (eliminating the weakest groups). Human subjects invested in helping group members to avoid having the lowest collective pay-off, whereas they failed to cooperate in control treatments with random group elimination or with no subdivision in groups. When the game was repeated, experience was found to promote helping. Thus, not within-group interactions alone, not random group elimination, but pay-off-dependent group elimination was found to drive within-group cooperation in our experiment. We suggest that some forms of human cooperation are maintained by multi-level selection: reciprocity within groups and lethal competition among groups acting together.
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spelling pubmed-35878842013-03-05 Human cooperation by lethal group competition Egas, Martijn Kats, Ralph van der Sar, Xander Reuben, Ernesto Sabelis, Maurice W. Sci Rep Article Why humans are prone to cooperate puzzles biologists, psychologists and economists alike. Between-group conflict has been hypothesized to drive within-group cooperation. However, such conflicts did not have lasting effects in laboratory experiments, because they were about luxury goods, not needed for survival (“looting”). Here, we find within-group cooperation to last when between-group conflict is implemented as “all-out war” (eliminating the weakest groups). Human subjects invested in helping group members to avoid having the lowest collective pay-off, whereas they failed to cooperate in control treatments with random group elimination or with no subdivision in groups. When the game was repeated, experience was found to promote helping. Thus, not within-group interactions alone, not random group elimination, but pay-off-dependent group elimination was found to drive within-group cooperation in our experiment. We suggest that some forms of human cooperation are maintained by multi-level selection: reciprocity within groups and lethal competition among groups acting together. Nature Publishing Group 2013-03-05 /pmc/articles/PMC3587884/ /pubmed/23459158 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep01373 Text en Copyright © 2013, Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
spellingShingle Article
Egas, Martijn
Kats, Ralph
van der Sar, Xander
Reuben, Ernesto
Sabelis, Maurice W.
Human cooperation by lethal group competition
title Human cooperation by lethal group competition
title_full Human cooperation by lethal group competition
title_fullStr Human cooperation by lethal group competition
title_full_unstemmed Human cooperation by lethal group competition
title_short Human cooperation by lethal group competition
title_sort human cooperation by lethal group competition
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3587884/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23459158
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep01373
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