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Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game

While the evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, little attention has been devoted to adversarial settings wherein one actor can directly harm another. Recent theoretical work addresses this issue, introducing an adversarial game in which the emergence of cooperation is heavily reliant on...

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Autores principales: D'Orsogna, Maria R., Kendall, Ryan, McBride, Michael, Short, Martin B.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3634082/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23630591
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061458
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author D'Orsogna, Maria R.
Kendall, Ryan
McBride, Michael
Short, Martin B.
author_facet D'Orsogna, Maria R.
Kendall, Ryan
McBride, Michael
Short, Martin B.
author_sort D'Orsogna, Maria R.
collection PubMed
description While the evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, little attention has been devoted to adversarial settings wherein one actor can directly harm another. Recent theoretical work addresses this issue, introducing an adversarial game in which the emergence of cooperation is heavily reliant on the presence of “Informants,” actors who defect at first-order by harming others, but who cooperate at second-order by punishing other defectors. We experimentally study this adversarial environment in the laboratory with human subjects to test whether Informants are indeed critical for the emergence of cooperation. We find in these experiments that, even more so than predicted by theory, Informants are crucial for the emergence and sustenance of a high cooperation state. A key lesson is that successfully reaching and maintaining a low defection society may require the cultivation of criminals who will also aid in the punishment of others.
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spelling pubmed-36340822013-04-29 Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game D'Orsogna, Maria R. Kendall, Ryan McBride, Michael Short, Martin B. PLoS One Research Article While the evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, little attention has been devoted to adversarial settings wherein one actor can directly harm another. Recent theoretical work addresses this issue, introducing an adversarial game in which the emergence of cooperation is heavily reliant on the presence of “Informants,” actors who defect at first-order by harming others, but who cooperate at second-order by punishing other defectors. We experimentally study this adversarial environment in the laboratory with human subjects to test whether Informants are indeed critical for the emergence of cooperation. We find in these experiments that, even more so than predicted by theory, Informants are crucial for the emergence and sustenance of a high cooperation state. A key lesson is that successfully reaching and maintaining a low defection society may require the cultivation of criminals who will also aid in the punishment of others. Public Library of Science 2013-04-23 /pmc/articles/PMC3634082/ /pubmed/23630591 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061458 Text en © 2013 D'Orsogna et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
D'Orsogna, Maria R.
Kendall, Ryan
McBride, Michael
Short, Martin B.
Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
title Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
title_full Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
title_fullStr Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
title_full_unstemmed Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
title_short Criminal Defectors Lead to the Emergence of Cooperation in an Experimental, Adversarial Game
title_sort criminal defectors lead to the emergence of cooperation in an experimental, adversarial game
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3634082/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23630591
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0061458
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