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The psychology of volition
Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in m...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2013
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3745827/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23354664 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3407-6 |
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author | Frith, Chris |
author_facet | Frith, Chris |
author_sort | Frith, Chris |
collection | PubMed |
description | Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in many other species including invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we can choose between different actions. Our experience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the experience of volition, that introspection and communication make possible, can change our experience of volitional actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are cultural phenomena that are unique to humans. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-3745827 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2013 |
publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-37458272013-08-20 The psychology of volition Frith, Chris Exp Brain Res Review Volition can be studied from two perspectives. From the third-person view, volitional behaviour is internally generated, rather than being determined by the immediate environmental context, and is therefore, to some extent, unpredictable. Such behaviour is not unique to humans, since it is seen in many other species including invertebrates. From the first-person view, our experience of volitional behaviour includes a vivid sense of agency. We feel that, through our intentions, we can cause things to happen and we can choose between different actions. Our experience of agency is not direct. It depends on sub-personal inferences derived from prior expectations and sensations associated with movement. As a result, our experiences and intuitions about volition can be unreliable and uncertain. Nevertheless, our experience of agency is not a mere epiphenomenon. Anticipation of the regret we might feel after making the wrong choice can alter behaviour. Furthermore, the strong sense of responsibility, associated with agency, has a critical role in creating social cohesion and group benefits. We can only study the experience of agency in humans who can describe their experiences. The discussion of the experience of volition, that introspection and communication make possible, can change our experience of volitional actions. As a result, agency, regret and responsibility are cultural phenomena that are unique to humans. Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2013-01-25 2013 /pmc/articles/PMC3745827/ /pubmed/23354664 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3407-6 Text en © The Author(s) 2013 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Review Frith, Chris The psychology of volition |
title | The psychology of volition |
title_full | The psychology of volition |
title_fullStr | The psychology of volition |
title_full_unstemmed | The psychology of volition |
title_short | The psychology of volition |
title_sort | psychology of volition |
topic | Review |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3745827/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23354664 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3407-6 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT frithchris thepsychologyofvolition AT frithchris psychologyofvolition |