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Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas distinguish themselves from general public good problems by encompassing both social and physical features. This paper examines how a physical mechanism, namely asymmetric payoff; and a social mechanism, reciprocity; simultaneously affect collective cooperation in...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ng, Cho Nam, Wang, Raymond Yu, Zhao, Tianjie
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3755971/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24015312
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0073793
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author Ng, Cho Nam
Wang, Raymond Yu
Zhao, Tianjie
author_facet Ng, Cho Nam
Wang, Raymond Yu
Zhao, Tianjie
author_sort Ng, Cho Nam
collection PubMed
description Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas distinguish themselves from general public good problems by encompassing both social and physical features. This paper examines how a physical mechanism, namely asymmetric payoff; and a social mechanism, reciprocity; simultaneously affect collective cooperation in theoretical water sharing interactions. We present an iterative N-person game theoretic model to investigate the joint effects of these two mechanisms in a linear fully connected river system under three information assumptions. From a simple evolutionary perspective, this paper quantitatively addresses the conditions for Nash Equilibrium in which collective cooperation might be established. The results suggest that direct reciprocity increases every actor’s motivation to contribute to the collective good of the river system. Meanwhile, various upstream and downstream actors manifest individual disparities as a result of the direct reciprocity and asymmetric payoff mechanisms. More specifically, the downstream actors are less willing to cooperate unless there is a high probability that long-term interactions are ensured; however, a greater level of asymmetries is likely to increase upstream actors’ incentives to cooperate even though the interactions could quickly end. The upstream actors also display weak sensitivity to an increase in the total number of actors, which generally results in a reduction in the other actors’ motivation for cooperation. It is also shown that the indirect reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooperative Nash Equilibrium.
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spelling pubmed-37559712013-09-06 Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective Ng, Cho Nam Wang, Raymond Yu Zhao, Tianjie PLoS One Research Article Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas distinguish themselves from general public good problems by encompassing both social and physical features. This paper examines how a physical mechanism, namely asymmetric payoff; and a social mechanism, reciprocity; simultaneously affect collective cooperation in theoretical water sharing interactions. We present an iterative N-person game theoretic model to investigate the joint effects of these two mechanisms in a linear fully connected river system under three information assumptions. From a simple evolutionary perspective, this paper quantitatively addresses the conditions for Nash Equilibrium in which collective cooperation might be established. The results suggest that direct reciprocity increases every actor’s motivation to contribute to the collective good of the river system. Meanwhile, various upstream and downstream actors manifest individual disparities as a result of the direct reciprocity and asymmetric payoff mechanisms. More specifically, the downstream actors are less willing to cooperate unless there is a high probability that long-term interactions are ensured; however, a greater level of asymmetries is likely to increase upstream actors’ incentives to cooperate even though the interactions could quickly end. The upstream actors also display weak sensitivity to an increase in the total number of actors, which generally results in a reduction in the other actors’ motivation for cooperation. It is also shown that the indirect reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooperative Nash Equilibrium. Public Library of Science 2013-08-28 /pmc/articles/PMC3755971/ /pubmed/24015312 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0073793 Text en © 2013 Ng et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Ng, Cho Nam
Wang, Raymond Yu
Zhao, Tianjie
Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
title Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
title_full Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
title_fullStr Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
title_full_unstemmed Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
title_short Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective
title_sort joint effects of asymmetric payoff and reciprocity mechanisms on collective cooperation in water sharing interactions: a game theoretic perspective
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3755971/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24015312
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0073793
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