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SPITE VERSUS CHEATS: COMPETITION AMONG SOCIAL STRATEGIES SHAPES VIRULENCE IN PSEUDOMONAS AERUGINOSA

Social interactions have been shown to play an important role in bacterial evolution and virulence. The majority of empirical studies conducted have only considered social traits in isolation, yet numerous social traits, such as the production of spiteful bacteriocins (anticompetitor toxins) and iro...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Inglis, R Fredrik, Brown, Sam P, Buckling, Angus
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Blackwell Publishing Inc 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3795443/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23106711
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2012.01706.x
Descripción
Sumario:Social interactions have been shown to play an important role in bacterial evolution and virulence. The majority of empirical studies conducted have only considered social traits in isolation, yet numerous social traits, such as the production of spiteful bacteriocins (anticompetitor toxins) and iron-scavenging siderophores (a public good) by the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa, are frequently expressed simultaneously. Crucially, both bacteriocin production and siderophore cheating can be favored under the same competitive conditions, and we develop theory and carry out experiments to determine how the success of a bacteriocin-producing genotype is influenced by social cheating of susceptible competitors and the resultant impact on disease severity (virulence). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that the spiteful genotype is favored at higher local frequencies when competing against public good cheats. Furthermore, the relationship between spite frequency and virulence is significantly altered when the spiteful genotype is competed against cheats compared with cooperators. These results confirm the ecological and evolutionary importance of considering multiple social traits simultaneously. Moreover, our results are consistent with recent theory regarding the invasion conditions for strong reciprocity (helping cooperators and harming noncooperators).