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Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. For the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, a new class of strategies has recently been described, the so-called zero-determinant strategies. Using such a strategy, a player can unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his own pa...
Autores principales: | Hilbe, Christian, Nowak, Martin A., Traulsen, Arne |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2013
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3815207/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24223739 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077886 |
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