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Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. A...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2013
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3824582/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23744445 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 |
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author | Brown, Harriet Adams, Rick A. Parees, Isabel Edwards, Mark Friston, Karl |
author_facet | Brown, Harriet Adams, Rick A. Parees, Isabel Edwards, Mark Friston, Karl |
author_sort | Brown, Harriet |
collection | PubMed |
description | Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this creates a conflict between action and perception; in that, self-generated movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal subjects—and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement—like schizophrenia and Parkinsonism—syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-3824582 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2013 |
publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-38245822013-11-21 Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions Brown, Harriet Adams, Rick A. Parees, Isabel Edwards, Mark Friston, Karl Cogn Process Research Report Active inference provides a simple and neurobiologically plausible account of how action and perception are coupled in producing (Bayes) optimal behaviour. This can be seen most easily as minimising prediction error: we can either change our predictions to explain sensory input through perception. Alternatively, we can actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions. In active inference, this action is mediated by classical reflex arcs that minimise proprioceptive prediction error created by descending proprioceptive predictions. However, this creates a conflict between action and perception; in that, self-generated movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces empirical results almost exactly. Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal subjects—and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement—like schizophrenia and Parkinsonism—syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission. Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2013-06-07 2013 /pmc/articles/PMC3824582/ /pubmed/23744445 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 Text en © The Author(s) 2013 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Research Report Brown, Harriet Adams, Rick A. Parees, Isabel Edwards, Mark Friston, Karl Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
title | Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
title_full | Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
title_fullStr | Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
title_full_unstemmed | Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
title_short | Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
title_sort | active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions |
topic | Research Report |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3824582/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23744445 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 |
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