Cargando…

Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives

BACKGROUND: Investment by manufacturers in research and development of vaccines is relatively low compared with that of pharmaceuticals. If current evaluation technologies favour drugs over vaccines, then the vaccines market becomes relatively less attractive to manufacturers. METHODS: We developed...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Régnier, Stéphane A, Huels, Jasper
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3846654/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24011090
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1478-7547-11-23
_version_ 1782293463058874368
author Régnier, Stéphane A
Huels, Jasper
author_facet Régnier, Stéphane A
Huels, Jasper
author_sort Régnier, Stéphane A
collection PubMed
description BACKGROUND: Investment by manufacturers in research and development of vaccines is relatively low compared with that of pharmaceuticals. If current evaluation technologies favour drugs over vaccines, then the vaccines market becomes relatively less attractive to manufacturers. METHODS: We developed a mathematical model simulating the decision-making process of regulators and payers, in order to understand manufacturers’ economic incentives to invest in vaccines rather than curative treatments. We analysed the objectives and strategies of manufacturers and payers when considering investment in technologies to combat a disease that affects children, and the interactions between them. RESULTS: The model confirmed that, for rare diseases, the economically justifiable prices of vaccines could be substantially lower than drug prices, and that, for diseases spread across multiple cohorts, the revenues derived from vaccinating one cohort per year (routine vaccination) could be substantially lower than those generated by treating sick individuals. CONCLUSIONS: Manufacturers may see higher incentives to invest in curative treatments rather than in routine vaccines. To encourage investment in vaccines, health authorities could potentially revise their incentive schemes by: (1) committing to vaccinate all susceptible cohorts in the first year (catch-up campaign); (2) choosing a long-term horizon for health technology evaluation; (3) committing higher budgets for vaccines than for treatments; and (4) taking into account all intangible values derived from vaccines.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-3846654
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2013
publisher BioMed Central
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-38466542013-12-06 Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives Régnier, Stéphane A Huels, Jasper Cost Eff Resour Alloc Research BACKGROUND: Investment by manufacturers in research and development of vaccines is relatively low compared with that of pharmaceuticals. If current evaluation technologies favour drugs over vaccines, then the vaccines market becomes relatively less attractive to manufacturers. METHODS: We developed a mathematical model simulating the decision-making process of regulators and payers, in order to understand manufacturers’ economic incentives to invest in vaccines rather than curative treatments. We analysed the objectives and strategies of manufacturers and payers when considering investment in technologies to combat a disease that affects children, and the interactions between them. RESULTS: The model confirmed that, for rare diseases, the economically justifiable prices of vaccines could be substantially lower than drug prices, and that, for diseases spread across multiple cohorts, the revenues derived from vaccinating one cohort per year (routine vaccination) could be substantially lower than those generated by treating sick individuals. CONCLUSIONS: Manufacturers may see higher incentives to invest in curative treatments rather than in routine vaccines. To encourage investment in vaccines, health authorities could potentially revise their incentive schemes by: (1) committing to vaccinate all susceptible cohorts in the first year (catch-up campaign); (2) choosing a long-term horizon for health technology evaluation; (3) committing higher budgets for vaccines than for treatments; and (4) taking into account all intangible values derived from vaccines. BioMed Central 2013-09-08 /pmc/articles/PMC3846654/ /pubmed/24011090 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1478-7547-11-23 Text en Copyright © 2013 Régnier and Huels; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
spellingShingle Research
Régnier, Stéphane A
Huels, Jasper
Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
title Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
title_full Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
title_fullStr Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
title_full_unstemmed Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
title_short Drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
title_sort drug versus vaccine investment: a modelled comparison of economic incentives
topic Research
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3846654/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24011090
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1478-7547-11-23
work_keys_str_mv AT regnierstephanea drugversusvaccineinvestmentamodelledcomparisonofeconomicincentives
AT huelsjasper drugversusvaccineinvestmentamodelledcomparisonofeconomicincentives