A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources

This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game mode...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Meng, Lingpeng, Kang, Qi, Han, Chuanfeng, Xu, Weisheng, Wu, Qidi
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Hindawi Publishing Corporation 2013
Materias:
Research Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3891240/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24459446
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/742845
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author Meng, Lingpeng
Kang, Qi
Han, Chuanfeng
Xu, Weisheng
Wu, Qidi
author_facet Meng, Lingpeng
Kang, Qi
Han, Chuanfeng
Xu, Weisheng
Wu, Qidi
author_sort Meng, Lingpeng
collection PubMed
description This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game model between the state and the terrorist and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An integer linear programming is proposed to obtain the equilibrium results when the facility number is fixed. The problem is demonstrated by a case study of the 19 districts of Shanghai, China.
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spelling pubmed-38912402014-01-23 A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources Meng, Lingpeng Kang, Qi Han, Chuanfeng Xu, Weisheng Wu, Qidi ScientificWorldJournal Research Article This paper is concerned with the effect of capacity constraints on the locations of terror response facilities. We assume that the state has limited resources, and multiple facilities may be involved in the response until the demand is satisfied consequently. We formulate a leader-follower game model between the state and the terrorist and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. An integer linear programming is proposed to obtain the equilibrium results when the facility number is fixed. The problem is demonstrated by a case study of the 19 districts of Shanghai, China. Hindawi Publishing Corporation 2013-12-28 /pmc/articles/PMC3891240/ /pubmed/24459446 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/742845 Text en Copyright © 2013 Lingpeng Meng et al. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Meng, Lingpeng
Kang, Qi
Han, Chuanfeng
Xu, Weisheng
Wu, Qidi
A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
title A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
title_full A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
title_fullStr A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
title_full_unstemmed A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
title_short A Game Theoretical Model for Location of Terror Response Facilities under Capacitated Resources
title_sort game theoretical model for location of terror response facilities under capacitated resources
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3891240/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24459446
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/742845
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