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Strong Stackelberg reasoning in symmetric games: An experimental replication and extension
In common interest games in which players are motivated to coordinate their strategies to achieve a jointly optimal outcome, orthodox game theory provides no general reason or justification for choosing the required strategies. In the simplest cases, where the optimal strategies are intuitively obvi...
Autores principales: | Pulford, Briony D., Colman, Andrew M., Lawrence, Catherine L. |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
PeerJ Inc.
2014
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3961161/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24688846 http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.263 |
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