Cargando…
Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study
Counterfactual thinking is thinking about a past that did not happen. This is often the case in “if only…” situations, where we wish something had or had not happened. To make a choice in a moral decision-making situation is particularly hard and, therefore, may be often associated with the imaginat...
Autores principales: | , , , |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2014
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4033199/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24904468 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00451 |
_version_ | 1782317785376882688 |
---|---|
author | Migliore, Simone Curcio, Giuseppe Mancini, Francesco Cappa, Stefano F. |
author_facet | Migliore, Simone Curcio, Giuseppe Mancini, Francesco Cappa, Stefano F. |
author_sort | Migliore, Simone |
collection | PubMed |
description | Counterfactual thinking is thinking about a past that did not happen. This is often the case in “if only…” situations, where we wish something had or had not happened. To make a choice in a moral decision-making situation is particularly hard and, therefore, may be often associated with the imagination of a different outcome. The main aim of the present study is to investigate counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning. We used a modified version of Greene's moral dilemmas test, studying both the time needed to provide a counterfactual in the first and third person and the type of given response (in context-out of context) in a sample of 90 healthy subjects. We found a longer response time for personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas. This effect was enhanced in the first person perspective, while in the elderly there was an overall slowing of response time. Out of context/omissive responses were more frequent in the case of personal moral dilemmas presented in the first person version, with females showing a marked increase in this kind of response. These findings suggest that gender and perspective have a critical role in counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning, and may have implications for the understanding of gender-related inclinations as well as differences in moral judgment. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4033199 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2014 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-40331992014-06-05 Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study Migliore, Simone Curcio, Giuseppe Mancini, Francesco Cappa, Stefano F. Front Psychol Neuroscience Counterfactual thinking is thinking about a past that did not happen. This is often the case in “if only…” situations, where we wish something had or had not happened. To make a choice in a moral decision-making situation is particularly hard and, therefore, may be often associated with the imagination of a different outcome. The main aim of the present study is to investigate counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning. We used a modified version of Greene's moral dilemmas test, studying both the time needed to provide a counterfactual in the first and third person and the type of given response (in context-out of context) in a sample of 90 healthy subjects. We found a longer response time for personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas. This effect was enhanced in the first person perspective, while in the elderly there was an overall slowing of response time. Out of context/omissive responses were more frequent in the case of personal moral dilemmas presented in the first person version, with females showing a marked increase in this kind of response. These findings suggest that gender and perspective have a critical role in counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning, and may have implications for the understanding of gender-related inclinations as well as differences in moral judgment. Frontiers Media S.A. 2014-05-20 /pmc/articles/PMC4033199/ /pubmed/24904468 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00451 Text en Copyright © 2014 Migliore, Curcio, Mancini and Cappa. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Neuroscience Migliore, Simone Curcio, Giuseppe Mancini, Francesco Cappa, Stefano F. Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
title | Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
title_full | Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
title_fullStr | Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
title_full_unstemmed | Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
title_short | Counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
title_sort | counterfactual thinking in moral judgment: an experimental study |
topic | Neuroscience |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4033199/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24904468 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00451 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT miglioresimone counterfactualthinkinginmoraljudgmentanexperimentalstudy AT curciogiuseppe counterfactualthinkinginmoraljudgmentanexperimentalstudy AT mancinifrancesco counterfactualthinkinginmoraljudgmentanexperimentalstudy AT cappastefanof counterfactualthinkinginmoraljudgmentanexperimentalstudy |