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Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortio...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4074784/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24975112 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05496 |