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Learning with repeated-game strategies
We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, St...
Autores principales: | Ioannou, Christos A., Romero, Julian |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2014
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4115627/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25126053 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2014.00212 |
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