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Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation n...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4129421/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25113502 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025 |
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author | Brañas-Garza, Pablo Espín, Antonio M. Exadaktylos, Filippos Herrmann, Benedikt |
author_facet | Brañas-Garza, Pablo Espín, Antonio M. Exadaktylos, Filippos Herrmann, Benedikt |
author_sort | Brañas-Garza, Pablo |
collection | PubMed |
description | In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4129421 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2014 |
publisher | Nature Publishing Group |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-41294212014-08-14 Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game Brañas-Garza, Pablo Espín, Antonio M. Exadaktylos, Filippos Herrmann, Benedikt Sci Rep Article In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems. Nature Publishing Group 2014-08-12 /pmc/articles/PMC4129421/ /pubmed/25113502 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025 Text en Copyright © 2014, Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder in order to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
spellingShingle | Article Brañas-Garza, Pablo Espín, Antonio M. Exadaktylos, Filippos Herrmann, Benedikt Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
title | Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
title_full | Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
title_fullStr | Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
title_full_unstemmed | Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
title_short | Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game |
title_sort | fair and unfair punishers coexist in the ultimatum game |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4129421/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25113502 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025 |
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