Cargando…

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation n...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Espín, Antonio M., Exadaktylos, Filippos, Herrmann, Benedikt
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4129421/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25113502
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025
_version_ 1782330232892555264
author Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Espín, Antonio M.
Exadaktylos, Filippos
Herrmann, Benedikt
author_facet Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Espín, Antonio M.
Exadaktylos, Filippos
Herrmann, Benedikt
author_sort Brañas-Garza, Pablo
collection PubMed
description In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-4129421
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2014
publisher Nature Publishing Group
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-41294212014-08-14 Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game Brañas-Garza, Pablo Espín, Antonio M. Exadaktylos, Filippos Herrmann, Benedikt Sci Rep Article In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems. Nature Publishing Group 2014-08-12 /pmc/articles/PMC4129421/ /pubmed/25113502 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025 Text en Copyright © 2014, Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder in order to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
spellingShingle Article
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Espín, Antonio M.
Exadaktylos, Filippos
Herrmann, Benedikt
Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
title Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
title_full Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
title_fullStr Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
title_full_unstemmed Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
title_short Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game
title_sort fair and unfair punishers coexist in the ultimatum game
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4129421/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25113502
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep06025
work_keys_str_mv AT branasgarzapablo fairandunfairpunisherscoexistintheultimatumgame
AT espinantoniom fairandunfairpunisherscoexistintheultimatumgame
AT exadaktylosfilippos fairandunfairpunisherscoexistintheultimatumgame
AT herrmannbenedikt fairandunfairpunisherscoexistintheultimatumgame