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Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all,...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2014
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4138163/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25137051 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105126 |
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author | Wang, Xiuling Wu, Jie Shu, Gang Li, Ya |
author_facet | Wang, Xiuling Wu, Jie Shu, Gang Li, Ya |
author_sort | Wang, Xiuling |
collection | PubMed |
description | In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4138163 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2014 |
publisher | Public Library of Science |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-41381632014-08-20 Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation Wang, Xiuling Wu, Jie Shu, Gang Li, Ya PLoS One Research Article In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff. Public Library of Science 2014-08-19 /pmc/articles/PMC4138163/ /pubmed/25137051 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105126 Text en © 2014 Wang et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Wang, Xiuling Wu, Jie Shu, Gang Li, Ya Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation |
title | Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation |
title_full | Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation |
title_fullStr | Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation |
title_full_unstemmed | Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation |
title_short | Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation |
title_sort | punishment based on public benefit fund significantly promotes cooperation |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4138163/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25137051 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105126 |
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