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Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation

In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Wang, Xiuling, Wu, Jie, Shu, Gang, Li, Ya
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4138163/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25137051
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105126
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author Wang, Xiuling
Wu, Jie
Shu, Gang
Li, Ya
author_facet Wang, Xiuling
Wu, Jie
Shu, Gang
Li, Ya
author_sort Wang, Xiuling
collection PubMed
description In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff.
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spelling pubmed-41381632014-08-20 Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation Wang, Xiuling Wu, Jie Shu, Gang Li, Ya PLoS One Research Article In prisoner's dilemma game (shortly, PD game), punishment is most frequently used to promote cooperation. However, outcome varies when different punishment approaches are applied. Here the PD game is studied on a square lattice when different punishment patterns are adopted. As is known to all, tax system, a common tool to adjust the temperature of the economy, is widely used in human society. Inspired by this philosophy, players in this study would pay corresponding taxes in accordance with their payoff level. In this way, public benefit fund is established consequently and it would be utilized to punish defectors. There are two main methods for punishing: slight intensity of punishment (shortly, SLP) and severe intensity of punishment (shortly, SEP). When the totaling of public benefit fund keeps relatively fixed, SLP extends further, which means more defectors would be punished; by contrast, SEP has a smaller coverage. It is of interest to verify whether these two measures can promote cooperation and which one is more efficient. Simulate results reveal that both of them can promote cooperation remarkably. Specifically speaking, SLP shows constant advantage from the point of view either of fractions of cooperation or average payoff. Public Library of Science 2014-08-19 /pmc/articles/PMC4138163/ /pubmed/25137051 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105126 Text en © 2014 Wang et al http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Wang, Xiuling
Wu, Jie
Shu, Gang
Li, Ya
Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
title Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
title_full Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
title_fullStr Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
title_full_unstemmed Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
title_short Punishment Based on Public Benefit Fund Significantly Promotes Cooperation
title_sort punishment based on public benefit fund significantly promotes cooperation
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4138163/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25137051
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0105126
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