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Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing

This study estimates a fixed effects ordered logit model physician office visit billing using claims data from South Carolina Medicaid and the State Employees Health Plan. The results find code creep increasing expenditures on physician office visits at a rate of 2.2 percent annually for both progra...

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Autor principal: Seiber, Eric E.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: CENTERS for MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 2007
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4195000/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17722753
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author Seiber, Eric E.
author_facet Seiber, Eric E.
author_sort Seiber, Eric E.
collection PubMed
description This study estimates a fixed effects ordered logit model physician office visit billing using claims data from South Carolina Medicaid and the State Employees Health Plan. The results find code creep increasing expenditures on physician office visits at a rate of 2.2 percent annually for both programs, with no significant difference in the rate between the two. The models also indicate that physician billing patterns differ between the programs, with the Medicaid claims averaging 1.3 percent less per visit than comparable State Employees Health Plan claims.
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spelling pubmed-41950002014-11-04 Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing Seiber, Eric E. Health Care Financ Rev Research Article This study estimates a fixed effects ordered logit model physician office visit billing using claims data from South Carolina Medicaid and the State Employees Health Plan. The results find code creep increasing expenditures on physician office visits at a rate of 2.2 percent annually for both programs, with no significant difference in the rate between the two. The models also indicate that physician billing patterns differ between the programs, with the Medicaid claims averaging 1.3 percent less per visit than comparable State Employees Health Plan claims. CENTERS for MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 2007 /pmc/articles/PMC4195000/ /pubmed/17722753 Text en
spellingShingle Research Article
Seiber, Eric E.
Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
title Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
title_full Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
title_fullStr Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
title_full_unstemmed Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
title_short Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
title_sort physician code creep: evidence in medicaid and state employee health insurance billing
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4195000/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17722753
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