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Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing
This study estimates a fixed effects ordered logit model physician office visit billing using claims data from South Carolina Medicaid and the State Employees Health Plan. The results find code creep increasing expenditures on physician office visits at a rate of 2.2 percent annually for both progra...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
CENTERS for MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES
2007
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4195000/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17722753 |
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author | Seiber, Eric E. |
author_facet | Seiber, Eric E. |
author_sort | Seiber, Eric E. |
collection | PubMed |
description | This study estimates a fixed effects ordered logit model physician office visit billing using claims data from South Carolina Medicaid and the State Employees Health Plan. The results find code creep increasing expenditures on physician office visits at a rate of 2.2 percent annually for both programs, with no significant difference in the rate between the two. The models also indicate that physician billing patterns differ between the programs, with the Medicaid claims averaging 1.3 percent less per visit than comparable State Employees Health Plan claims. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4195000 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2007 |
publisher | CENTERS for MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-41950002014-11-04 Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing Seiber, Eric E. Health Care Financ Rev Research Article This study estimates a fixed effects ordered logit model physician office visit billing using claims data from South Carolina Medicaid and the State Employees Health Plan. The results find code creep increasing expenditures on physician office visits at a rate of 2.2 percent annually for both programs, with no significant difference in the rate between the two. The models also indicate that physician billing patterns differ between the programs, with the Medicaid claims averaging 1.3 percent less per visit than comparable State Employees Health Plan claims. CENTERS for MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 2007 /pmc/articles/PMC4195000/ /pubmed/17722753 Text en |
spellingShingle | Research Article Seiber, Eric E. Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing |
title | Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing |
title_full | Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing |
title_fullStr | Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing |
title_full_unstemmed | Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing |
title_short | Physician Code Creep: Evidence in Medicaid and State Employee Health Insurance Billing |
title_sort | physician code creep: evidence in medicaid and state employee health insurance billing |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4195000/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17722753 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT seibererice physiciancodecreepevidenceinmedicaidandstateemployeehealthinsurancebilling |