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Interplay of Agency and Ownership: The Intentional Binding and Rubber Hand Illusion Paradigm Combined

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the phenomenal experience of initiating and controlling an action, whereas the sense of ownership (SoO) describes the feeling of myness an agent experiences towards his or her own body parts. SoA has been investigated with intentional binding paradigms, and the se...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Braun, Niclas, Thorne, Jeremy D., Hildebrandt, Helmut, Debener, Stefan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4219820/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25369067
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0111967
Descripción
Sumario:The sense of agency (SoA) refers to the phenomenal experience of initiating and controlling an action, whereas the sense of ownership (SoO) describes the feeling of myness an agent experiences towards his or her own body parts. SoA has been investigated with intentional binding paradigms, and the sense of ownership (SoO) with the rubber-hand illusion (RHI). We investigated the relationship between SoA and SoO by incorporating intentional binding into the RHI. Explicit and implicit measures of agency (SoA-questionnaire, intentional binding) and ownership (SoO-questionnaire, proprioceptive drift) were used. Artificial hand position (congruent/incongruent) and mode of agent (self-agent/other-agent) were systematically varied. Reported SoO varied mainly with position (higher in congruent conditions), but also with agent (higher in self-agent conditions). Reported SoA was modulated by agent (higher in self-agent conditions), and moderately by position (higher in congruent conditions). Implicit and explicit agency measures were not significantly correlated. Finally, intentional binding tended to be stronger in self-generated than observed voluntary actions. Results provide further evidence for a partial double dissociation between SoA and SoO, empirically distinct agency levels, and moderate intentional binding differences between self-generated and observed voluntary actions.