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DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes

The paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbehaving nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard [1]. Attacker node...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Soryal, Joseph, Liu, Xijie, Saadawi, Tarek
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier 2014
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4294757/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25685510
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jare.2013.11.001
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author Soryal, Joseph
Liu, Xijie
Saadawi, Tarek
author_facet Soryal, Joseph
Liu, Xijie
Saadawi, Tarek
author_sort Soryal, Joseph
collection PubMed
description The paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbehaving nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard [1]. Attacker nodes alter the IEEE 802.11 DCF firmware to illicitly capture the channel via elevating the probability of the average number of packets transmitted successfully using up the bandwidth share of the innocent nodes that follow the protocol standards. We obtained the theoretical network throughput by solving two-dimensional Markov Chain model as described by Bianchi [2], and Liu and Saadawi [3] to determine the channel capacity. We validated the results obtained via the theoretical computations with the results obtained by OPNET simulator [4] to define the baseline for the average attainable throughput in the channel under standard conditions where all nodes follow the standards. The main goal of the DoS attacker is to prevent the innocent nodes from accessing the channel and by capturing the channel’s bandwidth. In addition, the attacker strives to appear as an innocent node that follows the standards. The protocol resides in every node to enable each node to police other nodes in its immediate wireless coverage area. All innocent nodes are able to detect and identify the DoS attacker in its wireless coverage area. We applied the protocol to two Physical Layer technologies: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and the results are presented to validate the algorithm.
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spelling pubmed-42947572015-02-14 DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes Soryal, Joseph Liu, Xijie Saadawi, Tarek J Adv Res Original Article The paper presents a novel technique to detect Denial of Service (DoS) attacks applied by misbehaving nodes in wireless networks with the presence of hidden nodes employing the widely used IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols described in the IEEE standard [1]. Attacker nodes alter the IEEE 802.11 DCF firmware to illicitly capture the channel via elevating the probability of the average number of packets transmitted successfully using up the bandwidth share of the innocent nodes that follow the protocol standards. We obtained the theoretical network throughput by solving two-dimensional Markov Chain model as described by Bianchi [2], and Liu and Saadawi [3] to determine the channel capacity. We validated the results obtained via the theoretical computations with the results obtained by OPNET simulator [4] to define the baseline for the average attainable throughput in the channel under standard conditions where all nodes follow the standards. The main goal of the DoS attacker is to prevent the innocent nodes from accessing the channel and by capturing the channel’s bandwidth. In addition, the attacker strives to appear as an innocent node that follows the standards. The protocol resides in every node to enable each node to police other nodes in its immediate wireless coverage area. All innocent nodes are able to detect and identify the DoS attacker in its wireless coverage area. We applied the protocol to two Physical Layer technologies: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and the results are presented to validate the algorithm. Elsevier 2014-07 2013-11-09 /pmc/articles/PMC4294757/ /pubmed/25685510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jare.2013.11.001 Text en © 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
spellingShingle Original Article
Soryal, Joseph
Liu, Xijie
Saadawi, Tarek
DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
title DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
title_full DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
title_fullStr DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
title_full_unstemmed DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
title_short DoS detection in IEEE 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
title_sort dos detection in ieee 802.11 with the presence of hidden nodes
topic Original Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4294757/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25685510
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jare.2013.11.001
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