Cargando…
An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks
We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that h...
Autores principales: | Kamal, Salahuddin M., Al-Hadeethi, Yas, Abolaban, Fouad A., Al-Marzouki, Fahd M., Perc, Matjaž |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2015
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4351522/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25744058 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep08881 |
Ejemplares similares
-
Corrigendum: An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks
por: Kamal, Salahuddin M., et al.
Publicado: (2015) -
A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games
por: Perc, Matjaž, et al.
Publicado: (2015) -
Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
por: Wang, Zhen, et al.
Publicado: (2013) -
Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game
por: Perc, Matjaž, et al.
Publicado: (2010) -
Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
por: Szolnoki, Attila, et al.
Publicado: (2016)