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Tax authorities' interaction with taxpayers: A conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust
Tax compliance represents a social dilemma in which the short-term self-interest to minimize tax payments is at odds with the collective long-term interest to provide sufficient tax funds for public goods. According to the Slippery Slope Framework, the social dilemma can be solved and tax compliance...
Autores principales: | Gangl, Katharina, Hofmann, Eva, Kirchler, Erich |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Pergamon Press
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4381354/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25859096 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.12.001 |
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