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Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans
Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes th...
Autores principales: | Diekmann, Andreas, Przepiorka, Wojtek |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4437292/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25988875 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep10321 |
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