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A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games
As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails or...
Autores principales: | Perc, Matjaž, Szolnoki, Attila |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4457152/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26046673 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep11027 |
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