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A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation

Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However, proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of...

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Autor principal: Prasad, G. V. Ramesh
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4509566/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26199722
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13737-015-0025-9
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author Prasad, G. V. Ramesh
author_facet Prasad, G. V. Ramesh
author_sort Prasad, G. V. Ramesh
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description Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However, proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of poor end-stage kidney disease outcomes can be alleviated. In a moral dilemma analysis, the principle of preventing donor harm can be dissociated from the principles of providing benefits to the recipient and to society. It is plausible that an incentivized donor is fundamentally different from an uncompensated donor. Incentivized donors can experience harms unrelated to lack of regulation because their characteristics are determined by the incentive superimposed upon a poverty circumstance. Moreover, creating a system of incentivized donation without established national registries for capturing all long-term donor outcomes would be morally inconsistent, since without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are not income or wealth-dependent, a population of incentivized donors cannot be morally created in a clinical trial. Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in other surgical populations, and interventions on income or wealth in these populations have not been studied. Coercion will be increased in families not affected by kidney disease, where knowledge of a new income source and not of a potential recipient is the incentive. In the case of elective surgery such as kidney donation, donor non-maleficence trumps donor autonomy, recipient beneficence, and beneficence to society when there is a conflict among these principles. Yet, we are still faced with the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease, which belongs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kidneys. Acting according to one arm of the dilemma to prevent donor harm does not erase obligations towards the other, to provide recipient benefit. To resolve the moral burden, as moral agents, we must rearrange our institutions by increasing available donor organs from other sources. The shortage of donor kidneys creates a moral burden for society, but incentives for donation will only increase the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease.
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spelling pubmed-45095662015-07-22 A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation Prasad, G. V. Ramesh Transplant Res Commentary Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However, proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of poor end-stage kidney disease outcomes can be alleviated. In a moral dilemma analysis, the principle of preventing donor harm can be dissociated from the principles of providing benefits to the recipient and to society. It is plausible that an incentivized donor is fundamentally different from an uncompensated donor. Incentivized donors can experience harms unrelated to lack of regulation because their characteristics are determined by the incentive superimposed upon a poverty circumstance. Moreover, creating a system of incentivized donation without established national registries for capturing all long-term donor outcomes would be morally inconsistent, since without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are not income or wealth-dependent, a population of incentivized donors cannot be morally created in a clinical trial. Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in other surgical populations, and interventions on income or wealth in these populations have not been studied. Coercion will be increased in families not affected by kidney disease, where knowledge of a new income source and not of a potential recipient is the incentive. In the case of elective surgery such as kidney donation, donor non-maleficence trumps donor autonomy, recipient beneficence, and beneficence to society when there is a conflict among these principles. Yet, we are still faced with the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease, which belongs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kidneys. Acting according to one arm of the dilemma to prevent donor harm does not erase obligations towards the other, to provide recipient benefit. To resolve the moral burden, as moral agents, we must rearrange our institutions by increasing available donor organs from other sources. The shortage of donor kidneys creates a moral burden for society, but incentives for donation will only increase the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease. BioMed Central 2015-07-22 /pmc/articles/PMC4509566/ /pubmed/26199722 http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13737-015-0025-9 Text en © Prasad. 2015 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
spellingShingle Commentary
Prasad, G. V. Ramesh
A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
title A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
title_full A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
title_fullStr A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
title_full_unstemmed A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
title_short A moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
title_sort moral dilemma argument against clinical trials of incentives for kidney donation
topic Commentary
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4509566/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26199722
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s13737-015-0025-9
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