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Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations
This paper has two aims. First, we investigate how often people make choices conforming to Bayes’ rule when natural sampling is applied. Second, we show that using Bayes’ rule is not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule. Simpler methods, even fallacious heuristics, might prescribe correc...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4538240/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26347676 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01194 |
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author | Domurat, Artur Kowalczuk, Olga Idzikowska, Katarzyna Borzymowska, Zuzanna Nowak-Przygodzka, Marta |
author_facet | Domurat, Artur Kowalczuk, Olga Idzikowska, Katarzyna Borzymowska, Zuzanna Nowak-Przygodzka, Marta |
author_sort | Domurat, Artur |
collection | PubMed |
description | This paper has two aims. First, we investigate how often people make choices conforming to Bayes’ rule when natural sampling is applied. Second, we show that using Bayes’ rule is not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule. Simpler methods, even fallacious heuristics, might prescribe correct choices reasonably often under specific circumstances. We considered elementary situations with binary sets of hypotheses and data. We adopted an ecological approach and prepared two-stage computer tasks resembling natural sampling. Probabilistic relations were inferred from a set of pictures, followed by a choice which was made to maximize the chance of a preferred outcome. Use of Bayes’ rule was deduced indirectly from choices. Study 1 used a stratified sample of N = 60 participants equally distributed with regard to gender and type of education (humanities vs. pure sciences). Choices satisfying Bayes’ rule were dominant. To investigate ways of making choices more directly, we replicated Study 1, adding a task with a verbal report. In Study 2 (N = 76) choices conforming to Bayes’ rule dominated again. However, the verbal reports revealed use of a new, non-inverse rule, which always renders correct choices, but is easier than Bayes’ rule to apply. It does not require inversion of conditions [transforming P(H) and P(D|H) into P(H|D)] when computing chances. Study 3 examined the efficiency of three fallacious heuristics (pre-Bayesian, representativeness, and evidence-only) in producing choices concordant with Bayes’ rule. Computer-simulated scenarios revealed that the heuristics produced correct choices reasonably often under specific base rates and likelihood ratios. Summing up we conclude that natural sampling results in most choices conforming to Bayes’ rule. However, people tend to replace Bayes’ rule with simpler methods, and even use of fallacious heuristics may be satisfactorily efficient. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4538240 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2015 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-45382402015-09-07 Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations Domurat, Artur Kowalczuk, Olga Idzikowska, Katarzyna Borzymowska, Zuzanna Nowak-Przygodzka, Marta Front Psychol Psychology This paper has two aims. First, we investigate how often people make choices conforming to Bayes’ rule when natural sampling is applied. Second, we show that using Bayes’ rule is not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule. Simpler methods, even fallacious heuristics, might prescribe correct choices reasonably often under specific circumstances. We considered elementary situations with binary sets of hypotheses and data. We adopted an ecological approach and prepared two-stage computer tasks resembling natural sampling. Probabilistic relations were inferred from a set of pictures, followed by a choice which was made to maximize the chance of a preferred outcome. Use of Bayes’ rule was deduced indirectly from choices. Study 1 used a stratified sample of N = 60 participants equally distributed with regard to gender and type of education (humanities vs. pure sciences). Choices satisfying Bayes’ rule were dominant. To investigate ways of making choices more directly, we replicated Study 1, adding a task with a verbal report. In Study 2 (N = 76) choices conforming to Bayes’ rule dominated again. However, the verbal reports revealed use of a new, non-inverse rule, which always renders correct choices, but is easier than Bayes’ rule to apply. It does not require inversion of conditions [transforming P(H) and P(D|H) into P(H|D)] when computing chances. Study 3 examined the efficiency of three fallacious heuristics (pre-Bayesian, representativeness, and evidence-only) in producing choices concordant with Bayes’ rule. Computer-simulated scenarios revealed that the heuristics produced correct choices reasonably often under specific base rates and likelihood ratios. Summing up we conclude that natural sampling results in most choices conforming to Bayes’ rule. However, people tend to replace Bayes’ rule with simpler methods, and even use of fallacious heuristics may be satisfactorily efficient. Frontiers Media S.A. 2015-08-17 /pmc/articles/PMC4538240/ /pubmed/26347676 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01194 Text en Copyright © 2015 Domurat, Kowalczuk, Idzikowska, Borzymowska and Nowak-Przygodzka. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Domurat, Artur Kowalczuk, Olga Idzikowska, Katarzyna Borzymowska, Zuzanna Nowak-Przygodzka, Marta Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
title | Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
title_full | Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
title_fullStr | Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
title_full_unstemmed | Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
title_short | Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
title_sort | bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying bayes’ rule in elementary situations |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4538240/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26347676 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01194 |
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