Cargando…

Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game

Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a lin...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Pan, Liming, Hao, Dong, Rong, Zhihai, Zhou, Tao
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Nature Publishing Group 2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4543983/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26293589
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep13096
_version_ 1782386632168570880
author Pan, Liming
Hao, Dong
Rong, Zhihai
Zhou, Tao
author_facet Pan, Liming
Hao, Dong
Rong, Zhihai
Zhou, Tao
author_sort Pan, Liming
collection PubMed
description Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents’ payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player game where in each round each player will choose whether or not to put his tokens into a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor larger than one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-player games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication factor, a player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other players; (ii) a player is able to set the ratio between his payoff and the total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of players.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-4543983
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2015
publisher Nature Publishing Group
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-45439832015-09-01 Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game Pan, Liming Hao, Dong Rong, Zhihai Zhou, Tao Sci Rep Article Recently, Press and Dyson have proposed a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies for the two-player iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, so-called zero-determinant strategies. A player adopting zero-determinant strategies is able to pin the expected payoff of the opponents or to enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the opponents’ payoff, in a unilateral way. This paper considers zero-determinant strategies in the iterated public goods game, a representative multi-player game where in each round each player will choose whether or not to put his tokens into a public pot, and the tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor larger than one and then evenly divided among all players. The analytical and numerical results exhibit a similar yet different scenario to the case of two-player games: (i) with small number of players or a small multiplication factor, a player is able to unilaterally pin the expected total payoff of all other players; (ii) a player is able to set the ratio between his payoff and the total payoff of all other players, but this ratio is limited by an upper bound if the multiplication factor exceeds a threshold that depends on the number of players. Nature Publishing Group 2015-08-21 /pmc/articles/PMC4543983/ /pubmed/26293589 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep13096 Text en Copyright © 2015, Macmillan Publishers Limited http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
spellingShingle Article
Pan, Liming
Hao, Dong
Rong, Zhihai
Zhou, Tao
Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
title Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
title_full Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
title_fullStr Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
title_full_unstemmed Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
title_short Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
title_sort zero-determinant strategies in iterated public goods game
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4543983/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26293589
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep13096
work_keys_str_mv AT panliming zerodeterminantstrategiesiniteratedpublicgoodsgame
AT haodong zerodeterminantstrategiesiniteratedpublicgoodsgame
AT rongzhihai zerodeterminantstrategiesiniteratedpublicgoodsgame
AT zhoutao zerodeterminantstrategiesiniteratedpublicgoodsgame