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Attention-Seeking Displays
Animal communication abounds with extravagant displays. These signals are usually interpreted as costly signals of quality. However, there is another important function for these signals: to call the attention of the receiver to the signaller. While there is abundant empirical evidence to show the i...
Autor principal: | Számadó, Szabolcs |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4545794/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26287489 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0135379 |
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