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On Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable States That Are Not Characterised by the Folk Theorem
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the fundamental theory for non-cooperative games, defines all Nash equil...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
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Public Library of Science
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4545941/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26288088 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0136032 |