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Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4547490/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26339123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 |
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author | Hilbe, Christian Traulsen, Arne Sigmund, Karl |
author_facet | Hilbe, Christian Traulsen, Arne Sigmund, Karl |
author_sort | Hilbe, Christian |
collection | PubMed |
description | Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4547490 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2015 |
publisher | Elsevier |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-45474902015-09-01 Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() Hilbe, Christian Traulsen, Arne Sigmund, Karl Games Econ Behav Article Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. Elsevier 2015-07 /pmc/articles/PMC4547490/ /pubmed/26339123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 Text en © 2015 The Authors http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Hilbe, Christian Traulsen, Arne Sigmund, Karl Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
title | Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
title_full | Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
title_fullStr | Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
title_full_unstemmed | Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
title_short | Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
title_sort | partners or rivals? strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4547490/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26339123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 |
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