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Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()

Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Hilbe, Christian, Traulsen, Arne, Sigmund, Karl
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier 2015
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4547490/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26339123
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005
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author Hilbe, Christian
Traulsen, Arne
Sigmund, Karl
author_facet Hilbe, Christian
Traulsen, Arne
Sigmund, Karl
author_sort Hilbe, Christian
collection PubMed
description Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.
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spelling pubmed-45474902015-09-01 Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma() Hilbe, Christian Traulsen, Arne Sigmund, Karl Games Econ Behav Article Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. Elsevier 2015-07 /pmc/articles/PMC4547490/ /pubmed/26339123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 Text en © 2015 The Authors http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Hilbe, Christian
Traulsen, Arne
Sigmund, Karl
Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
title Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
title_full Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
title_fullStr Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
title_full_unstemmed Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
title_short Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
title_sort partners or rivals? strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma()
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4547490/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26339123
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005
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