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Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment
Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality,...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Routledge
2015
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4642180/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25791902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2015.1023400 |
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author | Kahane, Guy |
author_facet | Kahane, Guy |
author_sort | Kahane, Guy |
collection | PubMed |
description | Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as “utilitarian judgment” does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4642180 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2015 |
publisher | Routledge |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-46421802015-12-01 Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment Kahane, Guy Soc Neurosci Articles Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as “utilitarian judgment” does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed. Routledge 2015-09-03 2015-03-20 /pmc/articles/PMC4642180/ /pubmed/25791902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2015.1023400 Text en © 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Articles Kahane, Guy Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
title | Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
title_full | Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
title_fullStr | Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
title_full_unstemmed | Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
title_short | Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
title_sort | sidetracked by trolleys: why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment |
topic | Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4642180/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25791902 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2015.1023400 |
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