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Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordina...
Autores principales: | Chen, Xiaojie, Sasaki, Tatsuya, Perc, Matjaž |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4657016/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26597333 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep17050 |
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