Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity

Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the “Unlucky”) lost some money, another one (the “Passer-by”) could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a reputation that could be used by others in later interactions. The losses were either stable or stochastic, but the average loss over time and the average efficiency gains of helping were kept constant in both treatments. We found that players with a reputation of being generous were generally more likely to receive help by others, such that investing into a good reputation generated long-term benefits that compensated for the immediate costs of helping. Helping frequencies were similar in both treatments, but players with a reputation to be selfish lost more resources under stochastic conditions. Hence, returns on investment were steeper when losses varied than when they did not. We conclude that this type of stochasticity increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.