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Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity
Humans often forward kindness received from others to strangers, a phenomenon called the upstream or pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity. Some field observations and laboratory experiments found evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity in which chains of cooperative acts persist in social dilemma situ...
Autores principales: | , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4726336/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26786178 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep19471 |
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author | Horita, Yutaka Takezawa, Masanori Kinjo, Takuji Nakawake, Yo Masuda, Naoki |
author_facet | Horita, Yutaka Takezawa, Masanori Kinjo, Takuji Nakawake, Yo Masuda, Naoki |
author_sort | Horita, Yutaka |
collection | PubMed |
description | Humans often forward kindness received from others to strangers, a phenomenon called the upstream or pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity. Some field observations and laboratory experiments found evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity in which chains of cooperative acts persist in social dilemma situations. Theoretically, however, cooperation based on pay-it-forward reciprocity is not sustainable. We carried out laboratory experiments of a pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity game (i.e., chained gift-giving game) on a large scale in terms of group size and time. We found that cooperation consistent with pay-it-forward reciprocity occurred only in a first few decisions per participant and that cooperation originated from inherent pro-sociality of individuals. In contrast, the same groups of participants showed persisting chains of cooperation in a different indirect reciprocity game in which participants earned reputation by cooperating. Our experimental results suggest that pay-it-forward reciprocity is transient and disappears when a person makes decisions repeatedly, whereas the reputation-based reciprocity is stable in the same situation. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4726336 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2016 |
publisher | Nature Publishing Group |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-47263362016-01-27 Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity Horita, Yutaka Takezawa, Masanori Kinjo, Takuji Nakawake, Yo Masuda, Naoki Sci Rep Article Humans often forward kindness received from others to strangers, a phenomenon called the upstream or pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity. Some field observations and laboratory experiments found evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity in which chains of cooperative acts persist in social dilemma situations. Theoretically, however, cooperation based on pay-it-forward reciprocity is not sustainable. We carried out laboratory experiments of a pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity game (i.e., chained gift-giving game) on a large scale in terms of group size and time. We found that cooperation consistent with pay-it-forward reciprocity occurred only in a first few decisions per participant and that cooperation originated from inherent pro-sociality of individuals. In contrast, the same groups of participants showed persisting chains of cooperation in a different indirect reciprocity game in which participants earned reputation by cooperating. Our experimental results suggest that pay-it-forward reciprocity is transient and disappears when a person makes decisions repeatedly, whereas the reputation-based reciprocity is stable in the same situation. Nature Publishing Group 2016-01-20 /pmc/articles/PMC4726336/ /pubmed/26786178 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep19471 Text en Copyright © 2016, Macmillan Publishers Limited http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
spellingShingle | Article Horita, Yutaka Takezawa, Masanori Kinjo, Takuji Nakawake, Yo Masuda, Naoki Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
title | Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
title_full | Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
title_fullStr | Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
title_full_unstemmed | Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
title_short | Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
title_sort | transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4726336/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26786178 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep19471 |
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