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Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity is often claimed as one of the key mechanisms of human cooperation. It works only if there is a reputational score keeping and each individual can inform with high probability which other individuals were good or bad in the previous round. Gossip is often proposed as a mechanism...
Autores principales: | Számadó, Szabolcs, Szalai, Ferenc, Scheuring, István |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4732813/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26824895 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147623 |
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