Cargando…

Active Player Modeling in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is well known within the domain of game theory. Although it is relatively simple, it can also elucidate important problems related to cooperation and trust. Generally, players can predict their opponents' actions when they are able to build a precise m...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Park, Hyunsoo, Kim, Kyung-Joong
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Hindawi Publishing Corporation 2016
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4775783/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26989405
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/7420984
Descripción
Sumario:The iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is well known within the domain of game theory. Although it is relatively simple, it can also elucidate important problems related to cooperation and trust. Generally, players can predict their opponents' actions when they are able to build a precise model of their behavior based on their game playing experience. However, it is difficult to make such predictions based on a limited number of games. The creation of a precise model requires the use of not only an appropriate learning algorithm and framework but also a good dataset. Active learning approaches have recently been introduced to machine learning communities. The approach can usually produce informative datasets with relatively little effort. Therefore, we have proposed an active modeling technique to predict the behavior of IPD players. The proposed method can model the opponent player's behavior while taking advantage of interactive game environments. This experiment used twelve representative types of players as opponents, and an observer used an active modeling algorithm to model these opponents. This observer actively collected data and modeled the opponent's behavior online. Most of our data showed that the observer was able to build, through direct actions, a more accurate model of an opponent's behavior than when the data were collected through random actions.