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Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. In many dilemmas, such as elected governments negotiating climate-change mitigation measures, the decisions are made not by individual players but by their representatives. However, the behaviour of representatives in soc...
Autores principales: | Milinski, Manfred, Hilbe, Christian, Semmann, Dirk, Sommerfeld, Ralf, Marotzke, Jochem |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4786683/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26948250 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915 |
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