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Asymmetric Information in Iranian’s Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
BACKGROUND: Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of ins...
Autores principales: | Lotfi, Farhad, Gorji, Hassan Abolghasem, Mahdavi, Ghadir, Hadian, Mohammad |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Canadian Center of Science and Education
2015
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4803894/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26153155 http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/gjhs.v7n6p146 |
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