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Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than th...
Autores principales: | Szolnoki, Attila, Perc, Matjaž |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4804302/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27004605 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep23633 |
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