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Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm
The actions of pregnant women can cause harm to their future children. However, even if the possible harm is serious and likely to occur, the law will generally not intervene. A pregnant woman is an autonomous person who is entitled to make her own decisions. A fetus in‐utero has no legal right to p...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
John Wiley and Sons Inc.
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4913745/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26871875 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12238 |
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author | Wilkinson, Dominic Skene, Loane De crespigny, Lachlan Savulescu, Julian |
author_facet | Wilkinson, Dominic Skene, Loane De crespigny, Lachlan Savulescu, Julian |
author_sort | Wilkinson, Dominic |
collection | PubMed |
description | The actions of pregnant women can cause harm to their future children. However, even if the possible harm is serious and likely to occur, the law will generally not intervene. A pregnant woman is an autonomous person who is entitled to make her own decisions. A fetus in‐utero has no legal right to protection. In striking contrast, the child, if born alive, may sue for injury in‐utero; and the child is entitled to be protected by being removed from her parents if necessary for her protection. Indeed, there is a legal obligation for health professionals to report suspected harm, and for authorities to protect the child's wellbeing. We ask whether such contradictory responses are justified. Should the law intervene where a pregnant woman's actions risk serious and preventable fetal injury? The argument for legal intervention to protect a fetus is sometimes linked to the concept of ‘fetal personhood’ and the moral status of the fetus. In this article we will suggest that even if the fetus is not regarded as a separate person, and does not have the legal or moral status of a child, indeed, even if the fetus is regarded as having no legal or moral status, there is an ethical and legal case for intervening to prevent serious harm to a future child. We examine the arguments for and against intervention on behalf of the future child, drawing on the example of excessive maternal alcohol intake. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-4913745 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2016 |
publisher | John Wiley and Sons Inc. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-49137452016-06-22 Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm Wilkinson, Dominic Skene, Loane De crespigny, Lachlan Savulescu, Julian Bioethics Original Articles The actions of pregnant women can cause harm to their future children. However, even if the possible harm is serious and likely to occur, the law will generally not intervene. A pregnant woman is an autonomous person who is entitled to make her own decisions. A fetus in‐utero has no legal right to protection. In striking contrast, the child, if born alive, may sue for injury in‐utero; and the child is entitled to be protected by being removed from her parents if necessary for her protection. Indeed, there is a legal obligation for health professionals to report suspected harm, and for authorities to protect the child's wellbeing. We ask whether such contradictory responses are justified. Should the law intervene where a pregnant woman's actions risk serious and preventable fetal injury? The argument for legal intervention to protect a fetus is sometimes linked to the concept of ‘fetal personhood’ and the moral status of the fetus. In this article we will suggest that even if the fetus is not regarded as a separate person, and does not have the legal or moral status of a child, indeed, even if the fetus is regarded as having no legal or moral status, there is an ethical and legal case for intervening to prevent serious harm to a future child. We examine the arguments for and against intervention on behalf of the future child, drawing on the example of excessive maternal alcohol intake. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2016-02-12 2016-07 /pmc/articles/PMC4913745/ /pubmed/26871875 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12238 Text en © 2016 The Authors. Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Original Articles Wilkinson, Dominic Skene, Loane De crespigny, Lachlan Savulescu, Julian Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm |
title | Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm |
title_full | Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm |
title_fullStr | Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm |
title_full_unstemmed | Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm |
title_short | Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm |
title_sort | protecting future children from in‐utero harm |
topic | Original Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4913745/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26871875 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12238 |
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